The UK Climate Change Act by Taylor, Prue
Page 66 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 14, Issue 3 – August 2018
Prue Taylor and Kate Scanlen
The UK Climate 
Change Act
Abstract
The New Zealand government recently announced an intention to 
make the country carbon neutral by 2050. Interest has been expressed 
in using the United Kingdom’s Climate Change Act 2008 as a model 
to achieve this goal. However, more needs to be done to critically 
review the UK legislation’s applicability to the New Zealand context. 
This article identifies some of the issues emerging from a ten-year 
review of the UK act. It is hoped that close consideration of these 
issues will inform New Zealand policy and legislative development.
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Climate change is an urgent and complex global problem. Nations need to simultaneously address 
current impacts and reduce the risk 
of future impacts through aggressive 
mitigation over short time frames. To 
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contain global temperatures well below the 
dangerous 2°C threshold and pursue all 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C, the 2015 Paris Agreement requires 
national pledges for carbon reduction. 
However, the United Nations Environment 
Programme has found that the gap 
between national reductions needed and 
national pledges made is ‘alarmingly high’ 
(UN Environment, 2017). Pledges cover 
only one-third of what is needed to meet 
the Paris Agreement’s goal. Furthermore, 
the time frames are very short. The gap 
must be closed by implementation of more 
ambitious pledges by 2030. Achieving this 
target requires more ambitious pledges to 
be made by 2020. In response, the New 
Zealand government intends to create new 
legislation to achieve a net zero emissions 
target by 2050 (Mathiesen, 2017). There is 
interest in using the design of the United 
Kingdom’s Climate Change Act 2008 as 
a model. However, much has changed in 
the intervening ten years and New Zealand 
must think carefully about the design of 
its legislation. The outcomes must be fit 
for purpose in terms both of international 
realities and of the New Zealand domestic 
context. 
This article outlines some of the issues 
New Zealand should consider when 
designing its proposed Zero Carbon Act. It 
draws upon a ten-year review of the UK 
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Climate Change Act 2008 recently 
published by the Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment (Fankhauser, Averchenkova 
and Finnegan, 2018), and discussions with 
Grantham Research Institute and other 
policy experts. It also uses selected 
literature critiquing the Climate Change 
Act. It is not based on exhaustive analysis 
of available research. Given that policy 
development may proceed with some pace, 
due to our short electoral cycles, it is 
important to put these issues into the 
public domain as promptly as possible.1 In 
this regard, recent indications of emerging 
bipartisan support from the National Party 
may (not necessarily) expedite the policy 
and legislative process (Bridges, 2018). 
Overview of the UK Climate Change Act 
2008
The Climate Change Act adopts a long-
term carbon target of an 80% reduction 
in net national emissions from 1990 
levels by 2050 (s1). Net emissions are 
the sum of all gross national emissions 
less the amount of carbon removed from 
the atmosphere, through sinks such as 
forests. While this target was set before 
the Paris Agreement, it is still relatively 
ambitious. Many national pledges under 
the Paris Agreement use 2005 as a relative 
benchmark, which requires less emissions 
cutting than a 1990 target. It is also 
significant for being clearly framed as 
a legal duty upon the secretary of state. 
Amendment of the 2050 target is possible, 
but only through parliamentary assent, 
supported by ‘significant developments’ in 
current scientific understanding (s2).
To achieve this target, the act provides for 
carbon ‘budgets’ (or interim targets) every 
five years. These budgets have been described 
as ‘stepping stones’ towards the 2050 target, 
as they set a (theoretically) achievable 
progression of emissions reduction in place 
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2017). These are set in law by 
the secretary of state 12 years ahead (ss 4 and 
34). This progressive budget setting was 
thought to achieve a good balance of 
predictability – so industries were prepared 
in advance for the need to change – and 
flexibility (Weeks, 2017). To ensure budgets 
remain on track to be met, the government 
must report to Parliament on proposals and 
policies to achieve present and future budgets. 
If a budget is not met by its deadline, the 
government must explain to Parliament why 
and how this will be rectified (s19). This has 
not yet been necessary, as the first two budgets 
were comfortably met, and the country is 
currently on track to meet its third, 2018–22 
budget (Committee on Climate Change, 
2017). 
The act also established the independent 
Committee on Climate Change to provide 
expert advice on setting budgets and 
strategies to achieve them (ss 33–5). A 
chairman and between five and eight 
members make up the Committee on 
Climate Change, appointed by national 
authorities and representative of a range 
of experience and knowledge relevant to 
establishing a low-emissions economy 
(schedule 1). The committee’s main 
functions are to advise the secretary of state 
of the level of the next carbon budget and 
how to meet it, and to report on current 
progress in meeting present and future 
targets (ss 34 and 36). It has no decision-
making role but its monitoring and public 
progress reports do provide some 
accountability to government efforts. 
The act also covers national law on 
climate change adaptation, or preparing for 
the impacts of climate change such as sea 
level rise and changes in precipitation 
patterns. However, this has more limited 
scope than its provisions for emissions 
reduction. The government must assess 
local climate change risk and develop 
proposals and policies within an adaptation 
programme in response to this risk (ss 56 
and 58). The Committee on Climate Change 
also plays an advisory role and monitors 
progress made in achieving the proposals 
and policies within each programme (ss 57 
and 59). Finally, the act permits government 
to issue advice to other devolved authorities 
on preparing for climate change, allowing 
for more localised responses to climate 
change impacts (s64).
This model has enjoyed considerable 
success up to the present day, making it 
highly regarded. So far, five budgets have 
been set. Two budgets have been met and 
even exceeded, largely through converting 
the UK’s energy generation from 
predominantly coal burning to cleaner 
sources. The UK is also on track to meet 
its third (2018–22) budget. 
At the time of enactment, the Climate 
Change Act enjoyed bipartisan support. 
After the 2005 election, Friends of the Earth 
conducted the Big Ask campaign, which 
lobbied for greater climate change laws in 
the UK, with significant public buy-in. This 
inspired competition between the Labour 
government and their Conservative 
opponents over who would champion the 
climate change cause globally. The UK 
hosted the 2005 G8 summit, giving Prime 
Minister Tony Blair the opportunity to 
elevate the priority given to climate change. 
The 2006 Stern Review also had global 
influence, concluding that inaction on 
climate change would be far costlier to 
economies than acting to mitigate now 
(Stern, 2006). These events coincided with 
a strong economy (which is generally more 
favourable for environmental policy) and 
efforts to develop bipartisan support. Many 
have since speculated that without this 
unique political environment, the Climate 
Change Act would never have passed. Today 
it is seen as an exceptional model of climate 
change legislation, which some countries, 
such as Mexico and Sweden, have used to 
design their own climate change law. 
Climate Change Act concerns
While the Climate Change Act has the 
reputation as being the global gold 
While the Climate Change Act has the 
reputation as being the global gold 
standard in climate change law, some 
weaknesses are now becoming evident 
ten years on. 
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standard in climate change law, some 
weaknesses are now becoming evident 
ten years on. The country has enjoyed 
success with satisfying its first two, and 
likely three, carbon budgets. However, the 
fourth budget (2023–27) requires a much 
steeper reduction than previous budgets. 
Previous success has come largely from 
targeting ‘low hanging fruit’, such as coal-
fired electricity generation (Committee 
on Climate Change, 2017). It is unclear 
how the UK will fare meeting its newest 
budget (2023–27), now that innovation 
and potentially systemic change are 
necessary to do so. The Committee on 
Climate Change has now determined that 
a ‘policy gap’ exists in achieving future 
targets (ibid.). 
Recent government delay in creating 
policy to meet budgets has been one of the 
many concerns raised by the committee. 
Importantly, the Climate Change Act 
predates the Paris Agreement, which 
demands more ambition than the act’s 
target will deliver (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2016). This could be met by 
adjusting the 80% by 2050 target and 
developing more ambitious carbon budgets 
to meet it. However, no legal penalty 
mechanism exists if government fails to 
reach a carbon budget. The act relies 
primarily upon political sanction, subject 
to the possibility of judicial review (see the 
discussion below). The government may 
also meet budgets using internationally 
traded carbon credits, which appears 
increasingly relevant in light of new 
infrastructure strategies at odds with 
climate change mitigation, such as the 
Heathrow extension and local fracking. 
The Committee on Climate Change has 
criticised the use of international carbon 
credits, which do little to reduce national 
emissions at source (Committee on 
Climate Change, 2017). All these issues 
overlap and together suggest that climate 
change is no longer being treated as an 
urgent national priority in the UK. 
The committee’s most recent progress 
report is highly critical of the government’s 
efforts, noting that the UK is no longer on 
track to meet emissions targets in the 2020s 
and 2030s and calling for urgent action. It 
highlights recent cancellation of important 
programmes, including Zero Carbon 
Homes, and the lack of policies across the 
economy, including around transport, 
buildings and agriculture (Committee on 
Climate Change, 2018b). These deficiencies 
are undermining the stability and certainty 
the Climate Change Act was intended to 
achieve.
New Zealand’s interest in the UK act
New Zealand’s interest in the Climate 
Change Act is recent, yet strong. The UK’s 
success was brought to public attention 
in early 2017, when Lord Deben, the 
chair of the UK’s Committee on Climate 
Change, visited the country. Much like 
the Stern Report, Lord Deben used 
economic reasoning and long-term policy 
stability to argue in favour of bipartisan 
climate change action. This visit built 
upon the efforts of some New Zealand 
politicians to build cross-party consensus, 
reports demonstrating how the economy 
could transition to achieve radical 
emission reductions, and the advocacy 
of Generation Zero. Following this, 
successive parliamentary commissioners 
for the environment and the New Zealand 
Productivity Commission have published 
documents expressing general favour for 
the Climate Change Act (Weeks, 2017; 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2017, 2018). 
In 2018 the new New Zealand Labour 
government also expressed interest in 
basing new climate change law on the 
Climate Change Act. The current intention 
is to draft a climate change bill by October 
2018 (Office of the Minister for Climate 
Change, 2018). An Interim Climate Change 
Committee was established in April 2018 
to focus specifically on the agricultural and 
renewable energy sectors. It is expected that 
the findings of this committee will also 
inform development of the Zero Carbon 
Act. Public submissions were opened in 
June 2018, guided by the Ministry for the 
Environment’s discussion document. This 
document discusses the ‘highly regarded’ 
UK model, and it is apparent that the 
proposed Zero Carbon Act is largely based 
upon it. Currently up for public submission 
are included the nature of the target 
(whether carbon or all gases should be 
targeted to be reduced to ‘net zero’ by 
2050); the nature of proposed budgets, 
such as their duration and their flexibility 
to be changed; and the role of the proposed 
climate change commission (advisory 
board or decision-maker?) (Ministry for 
the Environment, 2018). While these issues 
are pertinent, by the proposals being based 
so closely upon the Climate Change Act, an 
assumption is created that it is the best 
model for New Zealand. 
Prior to the release of the discussion 
document , the  par l iamentar y 
commissioner for the environment released 
a report considering some of the challenges 
of the UK model for New Zealand, with 
particular concern about the very different 
emissions profile and system of 
environmental law (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 2018). 
The following section outlines additional 
concerns to be considered, which, in the 
opinion of the authors, warrant close 
attention. Some, but not all, of these issues 
have been identified in the discussion 
document. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer recently 
pointed out, legislation takes time to design 
and enact and details ‘matter a great deal’ 
(Palmer, 2018). Ultimately, the task is to 
create enduring legislation that translates 
international commitments into domestic 
goals that are implemented and achieved.
Political commitment
As noted above, Climate Change Act 
commentary frequently highlights 
the importance of building bipartisan 
political support prior to its enactment. 
... Climate Change Act commentary 
frequently highlights the importance of 
building bipartisan political support prior 
to its enactment.
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This determined the strength of key 
elements (e.g., the target, statutory five-
yearly carbon budgets and the role of 
the Committee on Climate Change). 
However, as successive budgets become 
more difficult to meet there is concern that 
the act may not be adequately designed 
to prevent policies from backsliding 
(Fankhauser, Averchenkova and Finnegan, 
2018). In short, there is real concern 
about the growing gap between budgets 
and policies robust enough to deliver on 
them. This observation demonstrates the 
importance of crafting legislation that can 
maintain and build political commitment 
reflective of the growing urgency of climate 
change. A general question is whether 
the commission should have the role of 
proactively engaging the public, as part of 
building the support needed to maintain 
and strengthen political commitment. 
Also needing close consideration is 
whether the government should be under 
a duty to demonstrate how its various 
policies will actually ‘add up’ to deliver 
on successive carbon budgets. This would 
facilitate timely scrutiny while providing 
greater certainty about carbon policies (in 
addition to the budgets) for investors, the 
public and successive governments. It may 
also assist with identifying how outcomes 
in different policy sectors support or 
contradict one another. New Zealand 
policymakers may also wish to consider 
the inclusion of statutory response 
times between budget adoption and the 
formulation of policy to meet the budget 
(Fankhauser, Averchenkova and Finnegan, 
2018). While the discussion document 
proposes that the public should submit 
on what should happen if a budget is not 
met, this topic is not discussed further and 
no proposals are made.
While political consensus has held in 
the UK, ensuring progressive (and more 
ambitious) policy development for four 
budgets, there is no guarantee that this will 
endure. There are no legal protections in 
the Climate Change Act. Given the 
weaknesses of New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements, policymakers may wish to 
consider whether the proposed Zero 
Carbon Act should be entrenched. While 
this may be politically very difficult, we 
should keep in mind the existential threat 
posed by climate change, together with 
critical human rights issues and the 
difficulties of legal action to compel 
government action (Palmer, 2018).2
Scope and integration
The Climate Change Act is narrowly 
focused on climate change. This reflects a 
fundamental choice made at the time to 
pursue climate change policy separately 
from broader integrative concepts such 
as sustainable development (Fankhauser, 
Averchenkova and Finnegan, 2018). It 
is also reflective of a strategic focus on 
climate change and energy, rather than 
more complex sectors such as agriculture 
and forestry. This narrow focus should 
be given very careful consideration in 
New Zealand. Apart from the well-known 
differences in emissions profiles, our 
environmental legislation is very different 
from that of the UK. ‘Sustainability’ and 
‘integrated resource management’ are 
hallmarks of our law, even in the absence 
of a national sustainable development 
strategy (Bosselmann, 2015). More recently, 
New Zealand has become a signatory 
to the United Nations 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals, which require 
integrated domestic implementation of 
all 17 goals. This includes a range of social 
and economic matters relevant to the issue 
of achieving ‘just transitions’ toward a low-
carbon economy that is also adapting to 
the effects of climate change. A strong 
sustainability framework addresses social 
justice and the critical matter of ecological 
limits, in an integrated manner. Other 
important trends include the Treasury’s 
development of a Living Standards 
Framework, which, if implemented, 
could significantly change New Zealand’s 
national accounting processes (New 
Zealand Treasury, 2018). In short, a strong 
sustainable development framework may 
be an important aspect of achieving 
integration of climate change mitigation 
and adaption across a broader suite of 
policy sectors.
In the UK, the institutional framework 
supporting the Climate Change Act 
reflected a primary focus on the energy 
sector. However, the dedicated Department 
for Energy and Climate Change recently 
merged with another department, creating 
the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy. It is not clear yet 
whether this change will resolve what is 
considered inadequate integration of 
climate change policy across the whole of 
UK government. As New Zealand’s 
emissions profile is significantly different 
from the UK’s, policymakers will need to 
give very careful consideration to the 
supporting institutional framework and 
how this can foster integration of climate 
change policy between key emission sectors 
and government institutions. If possible, 
New Zealand needs to avoid emerging 
limitations of the UK Climate Change Act: 
it has not been able to adequately address 
the emergence of inconsistent policy 
development (such as airport extensions 
and fracking) and cancellations of policy 
at short notice. Nor has it had adequate 
influence over housing, transport and 
labour policy (Fankhauser, Averchenkova 
and Finnegan, 2018; Committee on 
Climate Change, 2018b).
A related issue for New Zealand is 
whether the Zero Carbon Act should take 
a comprehensive all-emission-sectors 
approach from the outset. The interim 
committee has so far only been tasked to 
advise on agriculture and renewable energy. 
The discussion document does call for 
public submissions on whether just carbon 
or all greenhouse gases should be targeted. 
This discussion indicates that there may be 
a nuanced approach in New Zealand 
regarding different sources of emissions 
While the Climate Change Act has the 
reputation as being the global gold 
standard in climate change law, some 
weaknesses are now becoming evident 
ten years on. 
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and types of gases.3 The UK experience 
suggests that all sectors should be included, 
preferably from the start. In the UK it has 
been suggested that aviation and shipping 
should be accounted for under the Climate 
Change Act, and there has been delay in 
achieving this partly because they were not 
included at inception (s30; Fankhauser, 
Averchenkova and Finnegan, 2018).
Finally, how will the Zero Carbon Act 
integrate with other policy and legal 
frameworks? The New Zealand emissions 
trading scheme is an obvious case for 
close consideration and was the focus of 
the parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment’s recent report (2018), but 
what about other legislation that is 
currently underutilised, including the 
Land Transport Management Act, the 
Building Act and the Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation Act? More generally, 
how will the Zero Carbon Act achieve 
integration with the role of local 
government under the Local Government 
Act and Resource Management Act 
(RMA)? Significant changes in the roles 
and capacities of subnational government 
have occurred since the Resource 
Management (Climate Change and 
Energy) Amendment Act 2004, which 
confirmed centralisation of mitigation. A 
strong case can be made for returning 
mitigation responsibilities to local 
government through the RMA policy and 
regulatory framework, which includes an 
integrated guidance role from central 
government (Harker, Taylor and Knight-
Lenihan, 2017). Again, the UK experience 
may be instructive. The Climate Change 
Act adopts a very top-down approach 
which fails to integrate with local 
governments’ potential to contribute to 
climate change action (e.g., through 
urban planning and transport) and misses 
an opportunity to engage the public more 
directly in climate change policy. 
Mitigation and adaptation
It is less well known that the Climate Change 
Act creates a national policy framework 
for adaption, in addition to mitigation. A 
subcommittee on adaptation works to a five-
year cycle, beginning with a comprehensive 
climate change risk assessment, followed 
by a national adaptation programme. 
Relative to mitigation, adaptation policy 
has been slower to emerge and received 
less attention, resulting in ‘more planning 
than action’ (Fankhauser, Averchenkova 
and Finnegan, 2018). While this may be 
due to teething problems with the first 
assessment and adaptation programme, it 
also raises a much more fundamental issue: 
whether mitigation and adaptation should 
continue to be treated as related, but largely 
separate, policy sectors and, if not, what 
the appropriate institutional arrangements 
should be. The discussion document 
proposes to treat climate change adaptation 
in exactly the same way the Climate Change 
Act does, in a top-down manner and as an 
issue largely separate from climate change 
mitigation. However, this may be a critical 
opportunity to consider the emergence 
of ‘climate compatible development’, 
which treats the need to lower emissions 
and anticipate impacts while improving 
human well-being and ecological integrity 
as intimately connected tasks (Mitchell and 
Maxwell, 2010). 
Incorporation of international obligations
It has been said: ‘For a law dealing with 
a global environmental problem, the 
[Climate Change] Act is surprisingly 
domestic in its scope’ (Fankhauser, 
Averchenkova and Finnegan, 2018). The 
international context is one factor that 
must inform the Climate Change Act 
budgets, but they remain unilateral and 
a matter of domestic policy. This is only 
partially due to the act predating the Paris 
Agreement. Legislative incorporation of 
international obligations was not the act’s 
intention. Its continuing domestic focus 
affords the UK government considerable 
flexibility. Nevertheless, the Committee on 
Climate Change and other commentators 
have noted that the Climate Change 
Act will need to be made compatible 
with the Paris Agreement (ibid.) and its 
emerging architecture. This could include 
changing the target to ‘net zero emissions’ 
(as proposed in the Zero Carbon Act 
discussion document), enhancing the 
relevance of the national pledge (known 
as nationally determined contributions, 
or NDCs), or addressing climate finance 
and adaptation obligations together with 
the role of international carbon credits 
(ibid.). All these issues are important, 
but, more critically, policymakers need 
to address whether (and if so how) the 
Zero Carbon Act can be crafted to enable 
domestic interest groups to use it to 
facilitate the progressive development of 
ambitious NDCs (clearly linked to the 
Paris Agreement global warming limit 
of well under 2°C and preferably 1.5°C), 
together with timely compliance. NDCs are 
currently unilateral and non-binding, but 
are to be progressively strengthened over 
time, according to emerging principles 
(Brown et al., 2018). As such, NDC content 
and implementation is currently reliant on 
a combination of trust and ‘naming and 
shaming’. This could be greatly enhanced 
through the design of the Zero Carbon 
Act, the objective of which is to link the 
NDC process with the domestic budgets 
in terms of their ambition and compliance. 
More generally, how can domestic 
legislation be constructed to overcome a 
range of accountability (and other) gaps in 
international commitments and provide 
for evolution of the Paris Agreement 
architecture? In considering the complex 
interaction between international norms 
and domestic law, analysis of legal action 
by Plan B against the UK government and 
... the Committee on Climate Change 
and other commentators have noted 
that the Climate Change Act will need 
to be made compatible with the Paris 
Agreement (ibid.) and its emerging 
architecture. 
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the outcomes of the Thomson case4 in New 
Zealand will be instructive (Plan B, n.d.). 
On the face of it, the potential Zero 
Carbon Act target of ‘net carbon zero by 
2050’ might be compatible with the Paris 
Agreement, which requires a ‘balance 
between sources and sinks in the second 
half of the century’ (article 4). However, 
how this ‘net’ element is defined, accounted 
for and achieved will be critical and the 
timelines (for keeping within the Paris 
Agreement warming limit) depend upon 
emission rates.5 The Paris Agreement also 
requires peaking of emissions as soon as 
possible and rapid reductions thereafter 
(article 4). In this respect, it is notable that 
even though the Climate Change Act 
explicitly provides for the use of 
international credits to meet budgets, the 
consensus has been that targets should be 
met solely through domestic action 
(Fankhauser, Averchenkova and Finnegan, 
2018). As noted above, the Committee on 
Climate Change recently reiterated that 
credits (outside the EU system) should not 
be used to meet budgets, as this distracts 
from domestic reductions. Despite this, 
international credits are still given 
consideration in the discussion document 
and are open to public submission. Given 
New Zealand’s past reliance on 
international credits and problems with 
the emissions trading scheme, this will be 
a critical issue requiring explicit 
consideration. More generally, legislation 
needs to be carefully crafted regarding 
domestic reduction at source and the role 
of carbon sinks. 
Given the limited global carbon budget, 
New Zealand could consider the 
applicability of the ‘carbon law’ (or an 
equivalent for all gases) for creating 
quantifiable rather than percentage 
reductions, delivering a halving of gross 
emissions every decade (Rockström et al., 
2017). However, this approach would 
require a different model from that 
currently proposed by the Zero Carbon Act.
Role and composition of the commission
The independent and expert Committee 
on Climate Change is considered the 
‘fulcrum of the UK climate change 
architecture’ (Fankhauser, Averchenkova 
and Finnegan, 2018). It recommends 
successive budgets and monitors policy 
performance on both mitigation and 
adaptation. As an independent and expert 
technical body, it is seen as better equipped 
to take a more credible long-term view of 
policy (including budgets) than politicians. 
It also plays a critical role in monitoring 
and reporting processes intended to hold 
the government to account. It produces 
annual progress reports to Parliament, 
evaluating whether the government 
is going to remain within the budget. 
Government must respond within a 
statutory time frame. At the start of a 
budget, it will comment on the policies 
formulated to meet that budget. At the 
end of a carbon budget, the committee 
provides a detailed report on policy 
performance. In a recent report, it stated 
of the new UK Clean Growth Strategy: 
‘whilst some new policies are announced 
in the Strategy, the detailed policies and 
measures to meet the targets are not, in 
general, set out … a gap in meeting the 
fourth and fifth carbon budgets remains’ 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2018a, 
p.5). As previously noted, its most recent 
report criticised government policy and 
called for urgent action. However, the 
Committee on Climate Change does 
not act as a legal enforcer. Nor does the 
Climate Change Act include legal sanctions 
for failure to deliver adequate policy or 
to meet carbon budgets. Instead, it relies 
on political and public pressure and the 
possibility of judicial review proceedings 
by third parties (see legal accountability, 
below).
Some commentary has criticised the 
role of the Committee on Climate Change, 
claiming that it does not evaluate 
government policy as such, and in 
particular that it does not provide hard-
edged scrutiny (Church, 2015). This 
criticism raises a broad range of issues 
concerning how prescriptive legislation can 
and should be about policy priorities, 
processes, objectives and a requirement 
that policies ‘add up’ (i.e., it can be 
demonstrated how they are intended to 
actually achieve budgets). In other words, 
how should the government’s discretion to 
determine policy options be reconciled 
with a statutory duty to achieve a budget? 
Careful consideration of these and 
related issues may result in an enhanced 
evaluative role for a New Zealand climate 
change commission. Related to this is the 
politically sensitive matter of an enforcement 
role. It is generally considered that lack of 
enforcement powers is necessary to prevent 
an independent body from becoming 
politicised. However, given the urgency and 
human rights implications of climate 
change policy (together with the difficulties 
of judicial review – see below), some form 
of enforcement role should not be dismissed 
either for the commission or (in the 
alternative) for another independent body. 
The parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment is currently limited to a 
commissioner of inquiry role, with 
investigatory reports delivered to 
Parliament.6 There may be merit in 
considering an enhanced role for the 
commissioner or the creation of a new entity. 
In short, if some form of enforcement role 
for a climate change commission is not 
politically achievable or desirable, other 
options should be considered. The 
constitutional implications of creating a 
commission (or other independent agency) 
with a legal enforcement role also need to 
be carefully examined, as this may be 
considered a threat to New Zealand’s 
parliamentary supremacy. In this regard, it 
is important to note that the Committee on 
Climate Change does not have a decision-
making role; it merely recommends carbon 
While the Climate Change Act has the 
reputation as being the global gold 
standard in climate change law, some 
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budgets. Interestingly, Brexit has triggered 
UK debate about replacing the significant 
legal enforcement role of the EU 
Commission on environmental regulation 
with an independent environmental 
watchdog, potentially capable of taking legal 
action against government (Hill, 2017). 
The role chosen for the New Zealand 
commission (together with the scope of the 
Zero Carbon Act) will need to be carefully 
matched with relevant expertise. This could 
be legislated for, in a similar manner to RMA 
provisions on expertise of environment 
commissioners. In this regard, expertise to 
ensure policy evaluation against the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi will be 
a key consideration. This has the potential 
to lead to a far more holistic understanding 
of policy, reflecting a Mäori worldview of 
human–nature relationships and social 
justice. Consideration should also be given 
to ensuring representation of the interests 
of Pasifika communities and future 
generations. The composition of the New 
Zealand commission needs to balance the 
chosen ‘public role’ with its technical 
advisory role, particularly in relation to 
budget recommendations. It also needs to 
reflect expertise of all relevant policy and 
governance sectors, including local 
government. Funding mechanisms to 
ensure impartiality and fulfilment of its 
statutory role will also be essential 
(Fankhauser, Averchenkova and Finnegan, 
2018).
Legal accountability
Related to a potential enforcement role 
for a New Zealand commission (or other 
independent body) is the issue of judicial 
review. The Climate Change Act omitted 
any gateway provisions relating to appeals, 
including legal standing. This has led to 
uncertainty about aspects of judicial 
review proceedings. Questions to be 
considered include whether there should 
be express provision for matters such 
as statutory duties versus discretions; 
what elements can be reviewed; 
grounds for review; legal standing; and 
remedies (Fankhauser, Averchenkova 
and Finnegan, 2018). Given the burdens 
(and potential benefits) of legal action 
on climate change for citizens and public 
interest groups, additional elements to 
support legal action, such as legal aid, 
merit consideration ((Fisher, Scotford 
and Barritt, 2017).7 Decisions on these 
matters will be particularly important if 
the New Zealand commission (or other 
body) does not have legal enforcement 
powers. More generally, it has been 
suggested that many elements of judicial 
review warrant a radical rethink, given 
the particular challenges of climate 
change and the harms that can ensue 
(ibid.). In short, the balance between 
policy discretion and prescription needs 
to be carefully considered both in political 
terms and as it relates to judicial review 
proceedings.8 Finally, innovative climate 
change legislation for New Zealand could 
include the emerging environmental law 
principle of non-regression (Krämer and 
Orlando, 2018) and enhanced provisions 
for access to official information (Palmer, 
2018).9
Conclusion
The Climate Change Act is largely 
considered a success in terms of the way 
climate policy has been conducted in the 
UK, including the development of an 
empirical evidence base, regular reporting, 
enduring political consensus and 
certainty over carbon budgets. Significant 
transformation has occurred in the energy 
sector (Fankhauser, Averchenkova and 
Finnegan, 2018; Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2018). 
However, New Zealand policymakers need 
to carefully consider the extent to which it 
is a model fit for purpose for the critical 
decade leading up to 2030 and beyond. 
The objective of this article has been to 
raise some issues relevant to that task. 
New Zealand (and the world) has limited 
time both to achieve radical emission 
reductions and to address impacts. 
1 For a current and comprehensive guide to the development 
of climate change legislation, see Averchenkova, Fankhauser 
and Nachmany, 2017.
2 An alternative suggestion proposed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer 
involves constitutional reform, including the provision of an 
environmental right (Palmer, 2018).
3 Any exclusion or alternative treatment for methane as a 
short-lived gas needs to be very carefully investigated and 
justified.
4 Thomson v The Minister for Climate Change Issues [2017] 
NZHC 733.
5 Recent research concludes: ‘The 1.5 and 2°C warming 
targets are reached in 17–18 years and in 35–41 years, 
respectively, if the carbon emission rate is assumed to 
remain at its present-day value’ (Goodwin et al., 2018).
6 Sir Geoffrey Palmer (2018) considers the potential role 
of the Waitangi Tribunal, in addition to the parliamentary 
commissioner for the environment.
7 A recent Grantham Research Institute report notes that 
climate litigation has generally strengthened regulation 
and thus has a constructive influence. However, it can be 
a double-edged sword and be used to weaken or oppose 
regulation (Nachmany et al., 2017).
8 Sir Geoffrey Palmer (2018) notes judicial review is a limited 
mechanism for holding the New Zealand government 
to account for its climate change policy. To strengthen 
accountability, he proposes significant constitutional changes, 
including introduction of an environmental right. He argues 
that New Zealand needs a robust legal framework beyond 
single purpose legislation.
9 This principle is intended to ensure that accepted norms are 
not amended in a manner which weakens those norms. A 
constitutional right to the environment may have a similar 
influence.
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